This paper uses a bioeconomic model to analyze wildlife conservation in two habitats adjacent to a national park by two types of communities in the context of Southern Africa. One community is made up of peasant farmers operating under a bene…t-sharing scheme (CAMPFIRE) while the other is made up of commercial farmers practising game farming in a conservancy (the Save Valley Conservancy). Both communities exploit wildlife by selling hunting licenses to foreign hunters but with di¤erent levels of success. The park agency plays a central role by authorizing the harvest quota for each community. We formulate a bioeconomic model for the three agents, optimize the market problem for each agent and compare the outcomes with the social planner's solution. Our results show that the level of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency is suboptimal, while anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the conservancy community achieves social optimality. CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching e¤ort than what the social planner would recommend. Our model shows that an improvement in community institutions might have a signi…cant impact on growth of the wildlife stock through their role in constraining behaviour. Thus, institutional reforms in bene…t-sharing schemes such as CAMPFIRE could result in the local community behaving like game farming communities such as the Save Valley Conservancy.
Introduction
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), commonly referred to as Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), are central ¤ School of Economics, University of Cape Town, Private Bag Rondebosch 7701. Corresponding author: ntlher001@myuct.ac.za or ntuliherby@yahoo.com y Associate Professor, School of Economics, University of Cape Town. edwin.muchapondwa@uct.ac.za servancy and CAMPFIRE community); optimize the market problem for each agent and compare the outcomes with the social planner's solution; and …nally to suggest appropriate reforms that might encourage the CAMPFIRE community to move from a seemingly suboptimal regime to one that is optimal. Unlike previous studies, this paper seeks to establish the conditions under which the CAMPFIRE community can be incentivized to behave like the conservancy community, which is more successful in revenue generation and stewardship practice. Given the background above, three important questions arise: i) What are the signi…cant di¤erences between the two types of communities that interact with wildlife in Zimbabwe? ii) How and why do their di¤erences a¤ect livelihoods and stewardship practice? iii) Given the apparent superiority of conservancy outcomes in terms of livelihoods and conservation, how can we incentive CAMP-FIRE communities to behave like the conservancy community, i.e., what reforms are necessary in CAMPFIRE for it to achieve equivalent outcomes?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of community-based wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe and highlights the similarities and di¤erences between the CAMPFIRE and conservancy communities. Section 3 develops the bioeconomic model and computes estimates of some key parameters of the model, using data collected from communities around the GNP. Section 4 presents some comparative statics, including their policy implications and provides a discussion of the results of the optimization problems and model simulation. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
A History of Community-based Wildlife Conservation in Zimbabwe
In Zimbabwe, community-based wildlife conservation takes place mainly under two di¤erent CBNRM arrangements: conservancies and the CAMPFIRE programme. Zimbabwe has about eight conservancies with over 100 registered private game farms 3 , and 37 CAMPFIRE districts, managed by 37 RDCs that comprise 118 wards with over 121,500 households participating in wildlife conservation. The eight conservancies cover an area of 1,140,688 ha in total, while the CAMPFIRE wards cover approximately 2,478,000 ha in total. The potential for crop cultivation is extremely low due to harsh climatic conditions (Gandiwa et al., 2014) . This makes livestock rearing and wildlife conservation the most viable private investment options for both the conservancy and CAMPFIRE communities. According to Bell (1984) , emphasis on formal protected areas shifted during the 1970s with the recognition that islands of protection were inadequate for maintaining spatially heterogeneous biodiversity. The Parks and Wildlife Act (1975) gave landowners property rights to wildlife on their land (Murombedzi, 1999) . Kreuter et al. (2010) identi…ed groups of landowners within the bounds of the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Conservation Area that have incorporated their properties into conservancies or private nature reserves, thereby expanding the management scale of common pool wildlife resources. Due to its fugitive character, wildlife is managed as a community, rather than on individual farms, in order to supply the required habitat size. This also allows individual farms to specialize in o¤ering services and products that are in line with the resources found on their properties. Conservancies have played a crucial role in protecting wildlife and biodiversity on private farmland outside of formal protected areas since their establishment in Southern Africa during the early 1970s (Muir-Leresche and Nelson, 2000) .
The SVC is used in our paper as a case study of CBNRM arrangements involving private game farms in Zimbabwe. Its establishment was meant to rectify the ecological imbalances and environmental degradation caused by excessive cattle ranching during the 1920s, which subsequently forced wildlife to the outskirts of the valley (Fitzgerald, 2012) . As a matter of policy, it was suggested that decreasing the number of cattle and introducing the original wildlife back to the area would help to restore the natural balance. The SVC was formed by combining 24 adjoining farms measuring about 3200 km 2 . It is involved in intensive protection of rhinos, private game safaris, limited hunting concession and multi-species research. Farmers in the conservancy receive most of their income from high-quality and low-density tourism, including accommodation for travelers. Furthermore, it supports local communities by supplying jobs, allowing them to sell their arts and crafts, and improving and upgrading the Save Valley area.
Because of this intervention, the environment slowly recovered. Many of the indigenous plants and vegetation have been rehabilitated and the area has been successfully restocked with wildlife. Muir-Leresche and Nelson (2000) reported an increase in the area under conservation and wildlife population on private land. Moreover, the conservancy community exhibits characteristics that enhance CBNRM and coordinated decision-making for wildlife conservation (Krug, 2001; and Kreuter et al., 2010) .
Upon independence, the government enacted a new law, the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1982, which gave birth to the CAMPFIRE programme -a bene…tsharing scheme involving local communities. The law aimed to provide democratically elected RDCs the appropriate authority for managing wildlife within their geographical boundaries. This new paradigm entails conferring on local communities, through their respective RDCs, (i) greater control over formerly public wildlife in communal areas in de…ned territories, (ii) enhanced capacities to add value to local wildlife, and (iii) speci…c …nancial rewards linked to the estimated conservation value of wildlife within their territories (Gadgil and Rao, 1994; and Murombedzi, 1999) . Provided these commitments are forthcoming, the park agency steps back into the role of regulator and adviser, retaining the right to control wildlife harvesting quotas (Fischer et al., 2011) .
Previous studies have described the CAMPFIRE programme as a role model for CBNRM in Southern Africa (Murombedzi, 1999; Logan and Moseley, 2002; Muchapondwa, 2003; and Balint and Mashinya, 2006) . The fundamental idea behind such initiatives is that bene…ts from wildlife conservation should strengthen the incentives of local people in such a way that they treat wildlife as a valuable asset (Songorwa, 1999; Songorwa, 2000; and Balint and Mashinya, 2006) . Viewed as an asset, wildlife has the potential to provide local communities with a hedge against agricultural risk associated with extreme weather conditions, by creating employment and generating revenues (Muchapondwa and Sterner, 2012; and Poshiwa et al., 2013) .
However, the CAMPFIRE programme has enjoyed very limited success over the entire course of its establishment. Poaching subsided only temporarily after its commencement, as neighbouring communities started to reap economic bene…ts from legal wildlife utilization, and then rebounded a few years later (Fischer et al., 2011) . Both human-wildlife con ‡ict (Gandiwa et al., 2013a) and poaching incidents (Gandiwa et al., 2013b ) escalated during the fast-track land reform programme (FTLRP) in Zimbabwe, which spanned more than a decade starting in the year 2000. The FTLRP was also accompanied by severe economic hardships and human settlements encroaching on wildlife habitat. Thus, the CAMPFIRE programme experienced two major setbacks. The increase in poaching incidents seems to suggest that the CAMPFIRE programme failed to generate adequate incentives for local communities to conserve wildlife and that the FTLRP was disruptive, in the sense that it brought in settlers who were not interested in conservation. It is also hard to separate the economic incentives of CAMPFIRE from the general di¢culties of the land reforms.
This phenomenon is not unique to Zimbabwe; it has occurred in many other countries in the Southern Africa region (Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2005) . To this end, scholars argue that the impact of bene…t-sharing schemes such as CAMPFIRE is limited by possible dilemmas in the actual design of the scheme or trade-o¤s inherent in linking development and conservation objectives (Wells et al., 1999; Fischer et al., 2011; and Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2014) . These dilemmas are also closely intertwined with the nature of the community (i.e., the quality of local institutions that are in place) and the bene…t-cost structure (incentives) associated with the property rights system.
It is the intention of most governments in the region to improve the living standards of poor rural households living adjacent to national protected areas through wildlife-based land reform. Given this, it is imperative to understand how di¤erent types of CBNRM regimes or conservation models work and to use this information not only to take appropriate action to enhance wildlife conservation in existing communal areas but also to undertake reforms to safeguard good stewardship practices in conservancies. 4 Comparing how communities under CAMPFIRE operate with the conservancy community, we observe both similarities and striking di¤erences in community attributes such as institutions, management and utilization of common pool resources. The di¤erences in characteristics between the CAMPFIRE com-munity and the conservancy could be responsible for driving the discrepancies in outcomes between the two communities. Table 2 in the annexes summarizes some of these di¤erences and similarities.
However, in this paper we will model only those key attributes that we believe matter for conservation and welfare. The main di¤erence between the conservancy and CAMPFIRE community is that the former community is able to exercise anti-poaching enforcement, while the latter community can only engage in poaching. A community that derives bene…ts from wildlife conservation has adequate incentives to conservation wildlife. It is therefore rational for that community to abstracting from poaching and even engaging in anti-poaching activities. Anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the park agency and the conservancy has implications on the growth of the wildlife stock on communal and private land, and consequently on the welfare of the communities in question. In contrast, if a community lacks incentives to conserve wildlife, then it is unable to exercise anti-poaching enforcement. As a result, the community might chose to invest its e¤ort in poaching rather than in developing sound common pool resource institutions, which a¤ects the community's conservation and welfare outcomes 5 . Excessive poaching could have a negative impact on the stock of wildlife on communal land and inside the national park due to the absence of a fence.
Since the park agency is the custodian of wildlife in the country, it cares about the stock of wildlife on both communal and private land, in addition to the stock inside the national park. Potentially, both communities will bene…t if they are able to grow the stocks on private and communal land. Based on the knowledge and overall impressions about the community's conservation e¤ort, the park agency plays a central role in deciding the harvest quota for each community. In the next section, we use a bioeconomic model to evaluate the behaviour of various actors in order to propose institutional changes that might move individual decisions closer to the social optimum.
The Bioeconomic Model
The analysis focuses on comparing conservation and welfare outcomes for two di¤erent communities involved in wildlife management adjacent a formal protected area: the CAMPFIRE community gets part of the proceeds from wildlife conservation which are distributed to them as cash transfers, while the conservancy community manages wildlife and generates revenues directly through hunting and tourism activities. There are three agents, namely, the park agency, the conservancy and the CAMPFIRE community. We formulate optimization problems for each agent representing the baseline scenarios in terms of wildlife management (stock size and anti-poaching enforcement), and wildlife utilization (harvesting e¤ort and subsistence poaching e¤ort). We then compare the outcomes with those of the social planner and suggest reforms required to induce the CAMPFIRE community to behave like the conservancy community, which produces better conservation and welfare outcomes.
We adopt the standard assumption of a homogenous community where decisions are made at a group level, i.e., a community can choose to put e¤ort into either poaching or anti-poaching enforcement, depending on how it weighs the bene…ts and costs from wildlife conservation. This is a plausible assumption given the nature of decision-making we observe. Local communities use traditional institutions, which normally involve the chief or village headmen, where they meet under a tree and make decisions together as a group. Even though rebellion often occurs in the community, social norms help ensure the prevalence of a certain course of action by all members of the community. The conservancy community has committees and boards in place that make the crucial decisions on behalf of the group.
We assume that agents are managing a single wildlife species (e.g., African elephant) whose stock size is denoted by X i , where the subscript fi = 0; 1g denotes a patch of land. We acknowledge that the issue of relative sizes of the park and various communities is an important consideration, but we do not think that our key results are dependent on relative size 6 . Given the ine¤ectiveness of the fence between the park and communal lands, we assume that wildlife on that patch is managed as one stock. Intuitively, one could envisage the stock leaving the national park and roaming on communal land during the agricultural season (being attracted by crops) and returning to the protected areas after the season. Let X 0 denote the stock of wildlife shared by the park agency and CAMPFIRE communities and X 1 the stock managed by the conservancy. The following additional implicit assumptions apply: X i (t)¸0, X i (0) at time t=0 is given and X i (1) < 1, i.e., the stock of wildlife will not explode or grow toward in…nity as time tends toward in…nity because of the carrying capacity of the habitat and other limiting factors. Please refer to the appendix for a summary of de…nitions of symbols and the functional forms used in this paper.
No hunting takes place inside the national park, but it is allowed in areas outside the park. Therefore, in the absence of natural growth, X 0 potentially shrinks when the stock roams on communal land and is allowed to recover when it returns to the protected areas. Assuming a particular biomass at a speci…c point in time X i (t), the stock grows according to natural growth F (X i ; ¢) and shrinks due to trophy hunting h i and poaching Ã i (¢).
Stock dynamics on communal land
Stock dynamics inside the conservancy
whereL is anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the park agency, T e 1 denotes antipoaching e¤ort exerted by the conservancy, T p 0 represents the poaching e¤ort employed by the CAMPFIRE community and T p 1 represents the poaching e¤ort of the local communities bordering the conservancy. We assume that the growth function depends not only on stock size, but also on anti-poaching e¤ort, since its application facilitates growth in the wildlife stock. The natural growth function obeys the usual conditions:
In addition, we assume that F (0; ¢) = 0 = F (K; ¢), so that there is no growth if the stock size is either zero or reaches the carrying capacity of the resources system (Fischer et al., 2011) . Unlike Fischer et al., (2011), who emphasized poaching by outsiders but with assistance from the local community and anti-poaching enforcement by a few successful CAMPFIRE communities, we emphasize subsistence poaching activities by the majority of CAMPFIRE communities living adjacent to protected areas. Our approach is in line with Johannesen and Skonhoft (2014) . Accordingly, we assume that it is only the park agency that carries out anti-poaching enforcement both inside the park and in the communal areas adjacent to the protected area. The conservancy is responsible for anti-poaching e¤ort in its area. The CAMPFIRE community perpetrates poaching on communal land, while poaching inside the conservancy is carried out by the non-CAMPFIRE communities living adjacent to the SVC -this is motivated by the need to defray costs from the nuisance e¤ect of wildlife (Johannesen and Skohoft, 2014), for sel…sh reasons, i.e., hunting for meat and trophies (Marks, 1984; Barrett and Arcese, 1998; and Fischer et al., 2011) and also to protest the establishment of conservancies in areas viewed as traditionally belonging to local communities (Wels, 2000) .
Poachers do not take into consideration the impact of their actions on the future stock of wildlife. It is natural to assume that the poaching function increases with poaching e¤ort and reduces with anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency and conservancy community, i.e., Ã 0 (L; 0) = 0; @Ã 0 (¢) @T p 0 > 0 and @Ã 0 (¢) @L < 0 (5)
The second-order derivatives are such that the poaching function is concave with respect to poaching e¤ort and convex with respect to anti-poaching effort. The marginal productivity of poaching e¤ort decreases with anti-poaching enforcement.
It is assumed that there is no relationship between the stock of wildlife in the conservancy and in the national park because the conservancy is enclosed such that wildlife cannot move across borders. 7 The conservancy purchased live animals only once, when it was established, in order to boost its wildlife stock, and thereafter restocking ceased. By contrast, the stock of wildlife on communal land is linked to the population of wild animals in the national park due to the absence of an e¤ective fence. Thus, the wildlife stock on communal land replenishes itself because of its relationship with the park (i.e., wildlife is ordinarily harvested when roaming on communal land and recovers when it returns to the national park). Currently, property rights in wildlife belong to the state, both inside and outside the national park (Child, 1996; and Murombedzi, 1999) . Therefore, both the CAMPFIRE communities and the conservancy landowners have only use rights to wildlife. From this perspective, land tenure ceases to be an important variable in this analysis. For purposes of this model, we can assume that the property rights in wildlife "belong" to the park manager.
The park agency is responsible for allocating hunting quota h i to other players in the wildlife sector. Let h 1 and h 0 be the quota allocated to the conservancy and CAMPFIRE communities respectively. In practice, this could be implemented as h i = ¹ h i + " i , where average quota is adjusted on the basis of overall impressions about the community's conservation e¤ort, rather than the actual stock size, because the park agency usually lacks vital information such as animal counts and trophy quality in the study area. 8 The state has the right to grant appropriation authority (this includes both the right to use and right to income) to any individual or community (Murombedzi 2003) . In the case of the CAMPFIRE programme, the state gave the appropriation rights to the RDC instead of the local communities directly. Therefore, the RDC collects the revenues and makes the decisions about how the proceeds from wildlife conservation are allocated. The RDC generates wildlife income by selling hunting licenses to safari operators who, in turn, sell the licenses at a premium (s) to clients from overseas. The RDC's gross wildlife income is given by the following expression:
The parameter (s) can be interpreted as a premium charged by the safari operator above the fee paid to the RDC and includes his time spent looking for clients, time spent with clients during the actual hunting sessions, his skills, guns, etc. P ¤ is the …xed price per unit of harvest paid by the trophy hunters, and is exogenous to the communities because there is a competitive environment in the wildlife sector, such that no single community can in ‡uence the trophy price. Moreover, the fact that Zimbabwe is only one of the many countries o¤ering sport-hunting opportunities motivates the price-taking assumption (Fischer et al., 2011) . A fraction of the income (0 < ¿ < 1) goes into the hands of local communities, while the remainder (1 ¡ ¿) is retained by the RDC. Hence, the community receives:
The CAMPFIRE community is involved in di¤erent production activities, for example, agricultural production, poaching, anti-poaching enforcement and selling hunting licenses. Because the property rights of the park manager are not e¤ectively enforced on communal land, the local people are not e¤ectively prevented from illegally harvesting wildlife. Both communities allocate a …xed amount of e¤ort ( ¹ T i ) between the two activities, namely agricultural production (T a i ) and wildlife activities (i.e., either anti-poaching enforcement or illegal harvesting). Assuming a binding time constraint, we have:
where the superscripts fj = p; eg represent poaching e¤ort T p 0 by the CAMP-FIRE communities and anti-poaching enforcement T e 1 exerted by the conservancy. For a …xed size of agricultural land and hence neglecting the possible loss of wildlife habitat through agricultural expansion (Johannesen and Skonhoft, 2014), the agricultural yield function in the absence of wildlife damage depends on e¤ort when all other variable inputs are assumed to be …xed. The agricultural technology is given by:
The agricultural production function satis…es the usual concavity assumptions i.e., A(0) = 0, A 0 (:) > 0andA 00 (:) · 0. More wildlife means more nuisances, so that damages are proportional to the amount of wildlife (Carlson and Wetzstein, 1994; and Hueth et al., 1998) i.e.,
where¯¸0 is a …xed constant and D 2 [0; 1]. Ideally,¯captures the nuisance e¤ect of the wildlife stock (see also Zivin et al., 2000) . If the quantity of crops not damaged is 1 ¡ D i = 1 ¡¯X i , then the net crop bene…ts are given by:
The Park Agency's Problem
We assume that the park agency gets most of its income from non-consumptive tourism and budget allocation from the state, but not from selling hunting licenses, because trophy hunting is not permitted inside the national park. The park agency employs a small fraction of its anti-poaching e¤ort L outside the national park so that there is a small probability of being caught, µ 0 (¢), if the community decides to harvest wildlife illegally. We assume further that the probability of detection is a function of poaching e¤ort and the anti-poaching e¤ort of the park agency. The probability of being detected when hunting illegally is assumed to be an increasing function of the time spent hunting illegally, as well as the level of law enforcement exerted by the park agency, i.e., @µ 0 (¢)=@T P 0 > 0 and @µ 0 (¢)=@L > 0. In addition, we have µ 0 (L; 0) = µ 0 (0; T P 0 ) = 0. The marginal probability of detection increases with the level of anti-poaching e¤ort @µ 0 (¢)=@LT P 0 > 0. The park agency receives four types of bene…ts: i) budget from the state ¹ M , ii) revenue from benign tourism R(X 0 ), iii) the public goods value of wildlife G(¢), and iv) proceeds from poaching …nes µ 0 (¢)c 0 imposed on detected perpetrators. It is assumed that G(0) = 0; G 0 (¢) > 0; and G 00 (¢) · 0. The total cost of managing the park is given by v 0 L, where v 0 is the …xed cost per unit of anti-poaching e¤ort. The park agency chooses hunting quotas to allocate to di¤erent communities and the level of anti-poaching e¤ort to employ, which is split according to the land sizes inside and outside the park. The agency maximizes net bene…ts subject to stock dynamics of wild animals shared by the park agency and CAMPFIRE community, the stock of wildlife roaming the conservancy, the budget constraints and the participation constraints of the two communities, where the discount rate is given by ± > 0. (2014), the park agency bases its decision on inter-temporal considerations because it has the property rights to wildlife on both public and private land, and chooses both an optimal amount of e¤ort toward anti-poaching activities and optimal quota to give to CAMPFIRE communities and the conservancy. However, before the park managers can calculate the quota, they need to know the wildlife stock in each community. The current value Hamiltonian is given by
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with h 1 , h 0 and L as the control variables, X i as state variables,¸> 0 and ¹ > 0as shadow prices 9 for the shared stock X 0 and the stock inside the conservancy X 1 respectively and ¤ i as Lagrange multipliers. The following expressions can be obtained from the …rst-order condition:
According to Equation 14(b) above, the park agency employs anti-poaching e¤ort until the bene…ts of stopping crime and growing the shared stock X 0 equals the value of reduced poaching plus the marginal cost of employing antipoaching enforcement. Equations 14(c) and 14(d) tell us that the park agency allocates hunting quotas until the shadow price of the stock equals the market value.
The portfolio conditions (Equation 14(e) and 14(f) below) indicate that the sum of the wildlife gain and the net stock e¤ect resulting from maintaining one unit of wildlife must be equal to the marginal bene…t of harvesting and putting the proceeds into the bank.
On the assumption of the functional forms reported in the appendix, the market equilibrium levels of anti-poaching e¤ort by the park agency and the respective stocks of wildlife roaming inside the national park and on communal land and in the conservancy can be computed from the …rst-order conditions given above.
The steady-state o¤-take of wildlife can be solved for by substituting the optimal wildlife stock and anti-poaching e¤ort into the harvesting function. For comparison purposes, all solutions to the maximization problems presented in this analysis are shown at the end of this section.
The Conservancy Community
The private game farms employ T a 1 in agricultural production and anti-poaching e¤ort T e 1 in order to grow the wildlife stock. Bene…ts enjoyed by the private game farms come from agricultural production A 1 (¢), selling hunting licenses h 1 , revenues from tourism activities R(¢) and proceeds from poaching …nes µ 1 (¢)c 1 imposed on detected perpetrators on their land. Anti-poaching enforcement is costly, with v 1 as the …xed cost per unit of anti-poaching e¤ort. It is assumed that revenue from non-consumptive tourism R(X 1 ) increases with the stock of wildlife; that is, R(0) = 0, @R(¢)=@X 1 > 0 and @ 2 R(¢)=@X 2 1 < 0. The decision to be made by the conservancy community is how much antipoaching e¤ort T e 1 to invest in, while taking the o¤-take as given, because this is determined by the park agency through quota allocation h 1 . Because the conservancy community has appropriation rights (legal rights to exploit wildlife), they have a long-term view and therefore take the stock dynamics into consideration. For simplicity, we assume that the discount rate used by the park agency is the same as the discount rate used by the conservancy community and the social planner. Thus, the conservancy community's net bene…ts from agriculture and wildlife conservation are given by:
The production activities inside the conservancy are constrained by stock dynamics, the hunting quota and labour e¤ort. The current value Hamiltonian is given by:
The …rst-order condition with respect to anti-poaching e¤ort is therefore given by:
Equation 16 (b) tells us that the conservancy community will employ T e 1 until the bene…t of catching a poacher and the value of growing the stock of wildlife as a result of increasing e¤ort by a margin equals the value of losing agricultural harvest as a result of employing anti-poaching enforcement, the marginal cost of anti-poaching enforcement and the value of reduced poaching. In other words, the conservancy community allocates time toward anti-poaching activities until the loss from agriculture and anti-poaching equals the value of the growth in stock plus marginal bene…ts from collecting …nes. According to 16(c), the conservancy community will maintain the stock of wildlife at a level that equates the return from trophy hunting and tourism activities with the return from alternative assets.
On the assumption of the functional forms shown in the appendix, the market equilibrium levels of anti-poaching e¤ort by the conservancy community can be computed from the …rst order conditions. The optimal wildlife stock is the same whether computed by the park agency or conservancy.
The CAMPFIRE Community
We assume that the CAMPFIRE community takes both stock size and legal o¤-take h 0 as given. This is consistent with the behaviour we discovered in the survey, which suggest that community institutions are not strong enough to be proactive in conservation. The local community allocates its …xed endowment of labour e¤ort ¹ T 0 between two production activities, namely agriculture T a 0 and poaching T p 0 with´0 as the …xed per unit cost of poaching e¤ort. As a result, there is a probability of being caught denoted by µ 0 (¢), if community members engage in illegal harvesting of wildlife resources. If caught, the community is levied a …xed …ne µ 0 (¢)c 0 , paid to the park agency.
As usual, the unit price of agricultural output P a and illegal wildlife o¤-take ! are assumed to be …xed, where ! = P ¤ ¡ " and " is the discount associated with illegal sales. It is reasonable to assume that the price of the illegal o¤-take could be far less that the market price (i:e: ! << P ¤ ) because of institutional constraints associated with selling on the black market. Poachers sell their trophies at a lower price because they want to attract buyers and dispose of the trophies as quickly as possible to reduce the risk of being caught. The legal bene…ts from wildlife conservation ¿(P ¤ ¡ s)h 0 are exogenous to the local community. We assume that ¿ is …xed overtime and is decided on by the RDC at the beginning of the CAMPFIRE programme. In a way, this also removes the decision power of the RDC in deciding how much revenue to allocate to CAMP-FIRE communities, where all elements are given and not at its discretion. The CAMPFIRE community is taxed twice, …rst by the safari operator who charges a total commission of ¿sh 0 for the specialised services o¤ered, and then a second tax amount of (1 ¡ ¿)P ¤ h 0 by the RDC for general programme administration.
We assume that local people maximise short-run gains. Johannesen and Skonhoft (2014) argue that this myopic behaviour is reasonable because, in most cases, the legal bene…ts from conservation going into the hands of CAMPFIRE communities are too small relative to the cost of living with wildlife. Therefore, it is rational for the CAMPFIRE community to harvest as much as possible today, because of perceived risk and uncertainty in the future, e.g., they do not know if they may be e¤ectively prevented from harvesting tomorrow due to, say, improved law enforcement. Thus, the CAMPFIRE community maximizes current net bene…ts, shown in Equation (19), subject to the labour constraint.
M ax
The …rst-order conditions are given by
The local communities employ T P 0 until the bene…ts from an additional unit of poaching e¤ort equates to the loss in agriculture, the cost of poaching e¤ort and marginal loss due to paying …nes. On the assumption of the functional forms indicated in the appendix, the market equilibrium level of poaching e¤ort by the local communities can be computed from the …rst-order conditions.
If bene…ts from wildlife conservation increase, then the welfare of the local community as a whole also increases. This could be achieved when the poaching e¤ort exerted by the CAMPFIRE community is reduced and the population of wildlife on communal land increases, such that the quota allocation given to the local community also increases. Using proceeds from wildlife conservation, local communities around the GNP invest in public goods that bene…t the society as whole, such as schools, clinics, electricity and grinding mills, rather than distributing the income to households. Investing in public goods could have a signi…cant impact on community welfare.
The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner chooses anti-poaching enforcement, poaching e¤ort and hunting quotas in order to maximise the present value of net bene…ts from the activities of all the agents (e.g., agricultural production, trophy hunting, tourism activities, state budget, the public good value of the wildlife stock and proceeds from poaching …nes) subject to stock dynamics, budget, participation and harvesting constraints. The existence value or cultural value of the public goods might be di¤erent from what the park agency assumes. The social planner knows about the existence value ' that the local community places on the wildlife stock in their area and, hence, incorporates it in his valuation. The social planner is confronted with the following maximization problem: 
The …rst-order conditions with respect to anti-poaching e¤ort are given by:
According to Equation 19(b), the social planner employs anti-poaching e¤ort until the bene…t of growing the stock in and outside the park equals the value of reduced poaching, plus the cost of employing the anti-poaching e¤ort. Equation 19 (c) says that the social planner will allocate labour between agriculture and anti-poaching enforcement in the conservancy, until the bene…t of catching a poacher and the value of growing the stock of wildlife as a result of increasing anti-poaching e¤ort by a margin equates to the value of losing agricultural harvest as a result of employing anti-poaching enforcement, the marginal cost of anti-poaching enforcement and the value of forgone poaching. The …rst order condition with respect to poaching e¤ort is given by:
The social planner would allocate labour between agriculture and poaching until the bene…ts of reduced poaching due to an additional unit of poaching e¤ort (corrected for market distortions) equates to the loss in agriculture and the cost of poaching e¤ort. Equation 19 (e) and 19(f) state that the social planner will allocate hunting licenses until the shadow price and market price are equated, again correcting for market distortions.
Equations 19(g) and 19(h) show the evolution of the co-state variables over time. The social planner would, therefore, maintain the wildlife stock at a level that equates the return from wildlife conservation with the return from alternative assets. The return from the stock of wildlife is in terms of the change in the marginal valuation of the stock and stock e¤ects on revenue from wildlife tourism (in the case of wildlife stock in the conservancy) and natural growth of the wildlife stock.
The social planner's explicit solution can be computed from the …rst order conditions using the functional forms assumed and presented in the appendix. From the maximization problems discussed above, one can solve for the optimal anti-poaching e¤ort by the park agency and conservancy community i.e:L ¤ and T c¤ 1 respectively, poaching e¤ort exerted by the CAMPFIRE communities i.e. T p¤ 0 ,the steady state wildlife stock i.e. X ¤ 0 and X ¤ 0 and the optimal quota allocation i.e. h ¤ 1 and h ¤ 0 from all the equations presented in Section 3.1 through 3.4. Table 1 shows the comparison between the market equilibrium and the social planner's solution.
Results and Discussion
In this section, we start by commenting on the di¤erences in Table 2 and then narrow them down to the key roles of poaching and institutions in in ‡uencing biodiversity outcomes. We also consider some comparative statics, including the related policy implications, and numerical illustrations of the theoretical model.
Comparative Statics
Our results are consistent with theoretical expectations. The results above show that the stock of wildlife roaming in and outside the protected area, i.e., the shared stock X ¤ 0 and the stock managed by the conservancy X ¤ 1 could be less than what the social planner would prescribe. This also implies that the optimal harvest on communal land and in the conservancy is less than that of the social planner. The solution of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency L ¤ is ambiguous. The market solution is greater than the social planner's prescription if g 0 c 0 > !b 0 and vice versa. The fact that the market solution di¤ers from the social planner's outcome suggests that anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the park agency is suboptimal. Du¤y (1999) reported some ine¢ciency associated with anti-poaching enforcement in Zimbabwe. Anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the park agency decreases with the cost of employing that e¤ort, i.e., @L ¤ =@v o < 0, while increasing anti-poaching enforcement increases the probability of being caught, i.e., @L ¤ =@g o > 0. Given the latter result, it might be bene…cial for the park agency to increase L in order to grow the shared wildlife stock X ¤ 0 . If the conservancy community values wildlife as much as the social planner does, then the level of anti-poaching enforcement T e¤ 1 exerted by the conservancy achieves social optimality, i.e., both the market and the social planner's solution are the same. This is the case when a market e¢cient outcome is equal to a socially optimal level. With this level of anti-poaching enforcement, poaching activities are kept at their lowest level and, hence, the stock inside the conservancy will grow. We argue that the o¤-take inside the conservancy is e¢cient, because harvesting is determined by the quota set by the park agency, and poaching is contained through the employment of an e¢cient level of e¤ort which increases the probability of being caught, i.e., @T e¤ 1 =@g 1 > 0. Therefore, starting from a lower level of stock, if the anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the conservancy is both e¢cient and socially optimal, then this could drive the wildlife stock inside the conservancy towards optimality, provided that harvesting does not exceed the maximum sustainable yield.
The CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching e¤ort than the level the social planner would recommend. The role of poaching is to reduce the stock of wildlife when it is roaming on communal land. The o¤-take on communal lands is suboptimal, since harvesting is not only determined by the quota set by the park agency, but also by communities through poaching. Again, starting from a lower level, the wildlife stock in the community could diverge from the social planner's recommendation due to resource overexploitation. The di¤erences between the market and the social planner's solutions are driven by externalities. Given the fact that we are considering non-marketed goods, the market solution su¤ers from externalities, while the social planner takes externalities into account. To capture the deviation between the market and social equilibria, a parameter ! is included in the model to take into account the potential for the divergence to worsen under market equilibrium. Thus, as the price of the illegal harvest increases, the community increases its poaching e¤ort (i.e., @T p¤ 0 =@! > 0) in order to increase net bene…ts. This behaviour could lead to overexploitation of wildlife resources on communal land as the community seeks to maximize net bene…ts.
Our results show a negative relationship between poaching e¤ort and the price of agricultural output @T p¤ 0 =@P a < 0, the discount associated with illegal sales @T p¤ 0 =@" < 0 and the probability of being caught @T p¤ 0 =@g 0 < 0. From the analysis, it is evident that the CAMPFIRE communities su¤er a double tax; initially, the safari operator charges a commission s for the services rendered, and then the community loses a fraction 1 ¡ ¿ which goes to the RDC. E¤ectively, the price faced by the local community becomes ¿(P ¤ ¡ s) while the conservancy community gets P ¤ . Consequently, anything that deviates from the social planner's solution is not optimal and, thus, must be corrected.
Policy implications derived from comparative statics
The real result from this analysis is the uncovering of the policy instrument to improve outcomes in the CAMPFIRE communities and that was not imposed exogenously. We focus on policy because it is crucial on the conservation side through its e¤ect on the stock dynamics and also crucial on the welfare side through its e¤ect on economic bene…ts. The following policy interventions could potentially bene…t the CAMPFIRE communities if they were to be implemented. i. Reducing taxation on CAMPFIRE communities: From a policy stand point, local communities would bene…t if they could operate with the same self-su¢ciency as the conservancy community because both taxes could be avoided. This could be achieved by hiring a manager or building internal capacity to match that in the conservancy community. The di¤erences in the level of education between these two communities are revealing: the average number of years in school in the CAMPFIRE community is 7 compared to 15 in the conservancy.
ii. Reduce the price of illegal o¤-take: Likewise, a policy instrument that increases the risk premium " could decrease the e¤ective price of the illegal o¤-take and, hence, poaching e¤ort, i.e., @T p¤ 0 =@" < 0. Reducing the e¤ective price of the illegal o¤-take discourages the community from poaching by eroding the incentives, because @T p¤ 0 =@! > 0. It is possible to integrate the risk premium into CPR institutions by carefully designing policy instruments that are adapted to local conditions.
iii. Appropriate institutional reforms: As reported earlier, the survey results for the CAMPFRE community point to weak institutions that are not supportive of proactive conservation. This is dramatically opposite to the behaviour observed in the conservancy community. As a result, it motivates us to explore whether an institutional reform in the CAMPFIRE community could move its welfare and conservation outcomes closer to those of the seemingly successful conservancy community. Because the CAMPFIRE community exerts more poaching e¤ort in the market solution than the level that is socially optimal, we investigate the transition to social optimality by introducing an institutional variable which portrays a constraint on poaching behaviour. We argue that institutions a¤ect biodiversity indirectly through constraining human behaviour (Ntuli and Muchapondwa, 2015) . Thus, we introduce an institutional variable ½, which enters the model through the poaching function Ã 0 (¢). For this purpose, we will consider a variable ½ that measures lack of cooperation, such that, when ½ is zero, the community has sound institutions and cooperation is also high. When ½ is one, then institutions are very weak and there is no cooperation in the community. Accordingly, ½= 0 produces zero poaching, while ½ = 1 produces maximum poaching. Assuming the following explicit form, Ã(:) = a[½T P 0 ] Á ¡ b 0 L; b 0 > 0 and ½2 [0; 1], the modi…ed solution for poaching e¤ort is thus given by:
Most importantly, improvement in institutions might have signi…cant impact on growth of the wildlife stock through its role in constraining behavior, i.e., @T p¤ 0 =@½> 0. Thus, constraining poaching e¤ort might drive the stock shared by the park agency and CAMPFIRE communities toward the social planner's solution and avert a tragedy of the commons. The institutional variable ½ is a function of several other variables, such as governance, monitoring and enforcement, community level trust and endogenous punishment (see Ntuli and Muchapondwa, 2015) . As a matter of policy, we want ½ to be a number which is low and very close to zero.
One way to iron out all issues with the current CAMPFIRE setup is to give local communities autonomy and to empower the wildlife management committees, so that they are able to e¤ectively discharge their duties. This entails building local level institutions that will, in turn, set the community agenda on new social norms which are pro-conservation. For instance, an improvement in governance structures at the community level, monitoring and enforcement, and community level trust might contribute toward the attainment of a healthy biodiversity outcome as well as contain poaching activities. This could also be achieved through capacity building (institutional capacity) or training and funding to equip CAMPFIRE communities with much-needed resources. Moreover, if the community is allowed to endogenize punishment, then poaching might subside to socially optimal levels.
Numerical Illustration of Stock dynamics
The theoretical model will now be illustrated using functional form assumptions and data which …t well with the exploitation of the African elephant population by communities around the Gonarezhou ecosystem. African elephants are threatened by local communities because they cause more damage to agricultural crops than do other wild animals (Fischer et al. 2011) . Each year, quite a signi…cant proportion of elephants leaves the national park and visits the nearby communal areas during the agricultural season. Using MATLAB, we compute the optimal solutions from all the optimization problems presented above, and then proceed to show the stock dynamics as we vary anti-poaching e¤ort, poaching e¤ort and constrain the poaching e¤ort while holding other variables constant. Model simulation was done using the following stock dynamic equation in discrete form.
¡Ã i (¢; T P i ) given X i (0) at time t = 0
Following Johannessen and Skonhoft (2000), we normalize the catch-ability coef-…cient´to one so that the Schaefer harvesting function becomes h i (t) = ¾X i (t).
The harvesting e¤ort now belongs to the interval 0 < ¾ < 1 so that the o¤-take cannot exceed the available resources. The natural growth function is speci…ed as shown in the appendix, and again we normalise the size of the stock by setting the carrying capacity equal to one, i.e., K = 1. The size of the wildlife stock (measured in biomass level) is thus expressed as a fraction of the carrying capacity and must be in the interval 0 · X i (t) · 1. Furthermore, the intrinsic growth rate r is set equal to 0.3 (Caughley and Sinclar, 1994; and Johannessen and Skonhoft, 2000) . In line with other studies, we also force both poaching and anti-poaching e¤ort to lie between 0 and 1, i.e., 0 · L · 1; 0 · T e 1 · 1 and 0 · T p 0 · 1:
The model simulation results con…rm the theoretical predictions in Section 4.1.
In equilibrium, the anti-poaching e¤ort by the park agency is less than the level of e¤ort recommended by the social planner, while anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the conservancy community is just the same as that prescribed by the social planner. The poaching e¤ort employed by the CAMPFIRE community is twice as much as that required for social optimality. The equilibrium stocks under the market solution are less than the social planner's solution. Figure 1 shows the changes in the next period stock (i.e., the shared stock) as we vary anti-poaching enforcement exerted by the park agency between 0 and 1 while holding other variables constant. The …gure shows that the size of the wildlife stock on communal land increases as the park agency increases antipoaching e¤ort up to a certain point, and later on stabilizes at a slightly lower level than the social planner's recommendations. The gap between the market solution and the social planner's prescription does not completely iron out due to resource limitations. The numerical illustrations show that anti-poaching enforcement might grow the stock on communal land up to a certain level of e¤ort L ¤ = 0:62 that is socially optimal, beyond which the stock ceases to grow due to other factors beyond the park agency's control. Figure 2 shows the changes in wildlife stock inside the conservancy in the next period as we vary the anti-poaching e¤ort exerted by the conservancy community between 0 and 1 while holding other variables constant. The diagram shows that, if anti-poaching e¤ort by the conservancy community is optimal, then the stock size prescribed by the social planner and the market solution will eventually coincide. This is the case when the market solution is equal to social optimality. The convergence of the two solutions is very fast in the case of the conservancy community. Figure 3 shows the changes in the next period stock (i.e., shared stock) as we vary the poaching e¤ort exerted by the CAMPFIRE community between 0 and 1 while holding other variables constant. The …gure shows that the stock size on communal land diverges from the social planner's solution if poaching continues unabated. Initially, the wildlife stock outside the park increases with very low levels of poaching up to a certain point (about 0.26), then starts to decrease tremendously. If local communities continue to increase the level of poaching e¤ort beyond this point, then this could drive the resource system toward economic or physical extinction. Beyond a certain level of stock, again, the wildlife stock will not be able to regenerate itself without human intervention. Figure 4 shows the changes in the next period stock of wildlife (i.e., shared stock) as we introduce a variable for institutions and vary constrained poaching e¤ort exerted by the CAMPFIRE community between 0 and 1 while holding other variables constant. Starting from a lower level, the stock size in the local community's conservation area grows in a nonlinear fashion 10 until the solution coincides with the prescriptions of the social planner, if the poaching e¤ort is constrained. Ideally, we would want parameter ½ to be some number which is close to zero for faster convergence. The …gure below shows that, starting with ½= 1 (i.e., with the situation in Figure 4 above), an improvement in institutions, such that the parameter rho is forced toward zero (i:e: ½! 0), means that the shared stock mimic the dynamics of the wildlife stock inside the conservancy. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates how stronger institutions help to bridge the divide between the market and social planner's solution more quickly than do with weaker institutions. The graph below is drawn for the di¤erent values of rho, i.e., ½=1.00, 0.65, 0.02, 0.09 and Á = 0:3.
Conclusions
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects are central for future rural development in Southern Africa. However, the impact of bene…t-sharing schemes, such as the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe, is limited by possible dilemmas in the actual design of the scheme or trade-o¤s inherent in linking development and conservation objectives. The objectives of this paper are to compare wildlife management and utilization under the CAMPFIRE communities and conservancy community, and to consider the possibility of wildlife tenure and institutional reforms that might replicate conservancies' successful outcomes on communal areas implementing CAMPFIRE. Therefore, unlike previous studies, this paper seeks to establish the conditions under which a CAMPFIRE community can be incentivized to behave like the conservancy community, which is more successful in revenue generation and stewardship practice.
To achieve the objectives above, we used a bioeconomic model. We developed and compared the problems for bene…t-sharing arrangements under CAMPFIRE and the conservancy communities operating adjacent to Gonarezhou National 1 0 Non-linearity occur when the relationship between variables is not simply static, direct or exact, for instance, y = ax + b. This is a property of chaotic systems, characterized by random behavior and uncertainty such as in modelling extraction (growth) of natural resources or a social ecological system. If the resource base features non-lenearities, which is highly likely, that might also give rise to non-linearities in the growth path of the resource. Non-linearity and uncertainty requires pro-active and adaptive management rather than reactive management because we don't know, a priori, what will happen if the resource system is sub jected beyond its limit, e.g., harvested beyond its threshold. We also don't know what will happen to the ecological balance if one or more species were to disappear from the system. Park. Firstly, the paper showed that the conservancy community is superior to the pure bene…t-sharing scheme in terms of employment of e¤ort and the long-run wildlife stock. Secondly, the paper analysed wildlife management and utilization under the assumption that the communities in question are given autonomy to the degree that they are able to invest in stronger CPR institutions.
Our results show that the level of anti-poaching enforcement by the park agency could be lower than the social planner's prescription. It might not be optimal for the park agency to provide anti-poaching enforcement inside the national game park and in communal areas. This result seems to support policy or institutional reforms that convey greater control of natural resources through devolution and decentralization of NRM functions, and decision-making to the community's grass roots level, since the community incurs lower cost of monitoring and enforcement. Speci…cally, to strengthen the incentives in CAMPFIRE communities, we propose that the RDC should transfer wildlife management functions and bene…ts to sub-district producer communities. The social planner recommends higher levels of wildlife stock in the conservancy and on communal land, i.e., shared stock.
If the conservancy community values wildlife to same degree as does the social planner, then their level of anti-poaching enforcement achieves social optimality. This could drive the wildlife stock in the conservancy toward the social planner's solution, starting from a lower stock level. CAMPFIRE communities exert more poaching e¤ort than what the social planner would recommend. As a result, the size of the shared stock might diverge over time from the social planner's prescription, starting from a lower level. Because both the CAMPFIRE and conservancy communities are carrying out similar activities, they should potentially be able to achieve similar results. The di¤erences in observed outcomes between them could be a result of the di¤erences in community institutions. Our results con…rm that an improvement in community institutions might have sig-ni…cant impact on growth of the wildlife stock through its role of constraining behaviour. This result calls for policy instruments that will facilitate or promote the development of sound CPR institutions that are tailored to suit local conditions and endogenous to the community.
Table 1: Comparison of the Market Solution and the Social Planner's Solution

Market Solution
Sign Social Planner 
Similarities
-Same geographical region and located adjacent to GNP -Similar activities (i.e., agricultural production and wildlife conservation) -Decision about how much to harvest are made at national level by ZNPWA -Wildlife in Zimbabwe is property of the state and no one individual or group owns it -Wildlife is managed as a Common Property Resource (CPR) due to the absence of internal boundaries -Wildlife is harvested both legally and illegally -Anti-poaching enforcement is done at group level -The clients who eventually utilize the quota are the same -Income from trophy hunting 
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